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ABSTRACT 
In response to public outrage over police use of force, Police Executive Research 
Forum (PERF) dedicated its Critical Issues Seminars to discussing use-of-force reform. 
From the seminars, PERF produced 30 guiding principles, which included best-practice 
policy recommendations that called for agencies to adopt standards that went higher than 
the Graham v. Connor standard of reasonableness in the eyes of the officer involved. The 
focus of this thesis was to study what the effect of going beyond current legal standards 
might have on use-of-force incidents in practice and in the public perception. It also 
looked to find whether the policy principles put forward could make policing safer for 
officers and the public they serve. The research showed there was serious debate over 
the applicability and understanding of PERF’s policies. Experts felt the PERF policies 
should not be adopted as stand-alone policies and further context was required. PERF 
failed to define the problem it was attempting to solve and only created more 
confusion with its policy recommendations; no change to law or policy will make 
policing safer. This thesis recommends that law enforcement, anti-police advocates, and 
politicians work together to bridge the gap that is felt at every angle of the debate. 
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The narrative of police brutality by racist cops and the immediate call for use-of-
force reform began in 2014 in Ferguson, Missouri, and continued after a series of other 
high-profile fatal police shootings. Public and political sentiment ranged from frustration 
to hatred toward law enforcement. Constant media attention validated the public’s anger 
with a barrage of stories highlighting the racial differences between the police officers 
and the individuals shot. The anger and frustration felt by communities around the nation 
boiled over in protests, riots, and the call for violence toward police from select groups. 
Activists organized and political leaders issued statements contributing to the narrative 
that police killings have been racially motivated. Politicians around the nation, from local 
city council members to the President of the United States, commented on the fact that 
they felt race was a factor in the recent shootings and within the entire criminal justice 
system. Contempt for police came from every faction of society.  
Comments on social media posts and articles have echoed these narratives with 
charges of racial discrimination and calls to disarm police forces. Many use social media 
to call for violence against police. In 2016, police ambush killings increased by 163 
percent from 2015.1 The year ended with 64 officers killed in ambush attacks.2  
In response to the public outcry after the events in Ferguson, the Police Executive 
Research Forum (PERF) refocused a series of already scheduled “Defining Moments” 
seminars to address law enforcement’s role in the increasing conflict with community 
members. The seminars produced three separate reports: Defining Moments for Police 
Chiefs, Re-engineering Training on Police Use of Force, and 30 Guiding Principles on 
the Use of Force.3 The 30 Guiding Principles report provided best-practice policy 
                                                 
1 “Preliminary 2016 Law Enforcement Officer Fatalities Report,” National Law Enforcement Officers 
Memorial Fund, accessed February 15, 2017, http://www.nleomf.org/assets/pdfs/reports/Preliminary-2016-
EOY-Officer-Fatalities-Report.pdf. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), Defining Moments for Police Chiefs (Washington, DC: 
PERF, 2016); PERF, Re-engineering Training on Police Use of Force (Washington, DC: PERF, 2016); 
PERF, PERF’s 30 Guiding Principles on Use of Force (Washington, DC: PERF, 2016). 
 xiv 
recommendations on use of force that were immediately controversial, garnering 
attention from major police groups and police attorneys. 
My thesis dissects and analyzes PERF’s proposals regarding use-of-force reform 
and its guiding principles, specifically the recommendation to “go beyond the minimum 
requirements” of Graham v. Connor.4 It examines what effect going beyond current legal 
standards might have on use-of-force incidents in practice and in the public perception? It 
also seeks to determine if the policy principles put forward by PERF in its 
recommendations could make policing safer for officers and the public they serve. I use 
the current laws governing use of force and the history of how those laws came to be in 
order to understand how they relate to use of force. I also determine how the current laws 
relate to the discretion and authority afforded to law enforcement. 
Over the years, the Supreme Court has diligently created and refined a balancing 
test for analyzing excessive-force claims. The framework allows for the fact that police 
are often placed in situations in which force is necessary based on the officer’s immediate 
perceptions. These standards matter because, as long as a police officer is found to be 
acting lawfully within the range of official duties, then he or she enjoys immunity from 
prosecution, even if the officer’s actions result in the injury or death of a suspect. 
PERF’s 30 Guiding Principles included thirteen recommended policies with 
central themes such as: law enforcement should value the sanctity of human life, use 
force that is proportionate, and de-escalate whenever possible. Many police executives 
and police attorneys have weighed in on PERF’s guiding principles and the context in 
which they were created. The actual recommended principles, as pointed out by Michael 
Ranalli, were “so intertwined” that while they could, and should, be applied to all 
training; they should not be considered “‘stand alone” or “complete concepts.”5  
PERF’s high profile and the political charge of the issue of police use of force 
attach great weight to statements condemning officers and calling for increased standards. 
                                                 
4 PERF, PERF’s 30 Guiding Principles, 17. 
5 Michael D. Ranalli, “Adding Perspective to the PERF Guiding Principles on use of Force: What 
Police Administrators Should Consider,” New York State Chief’s Chronicle (June 2016): 7–11, 
https://www.nychiefs.org/images/chronicle/June_16.pdf.  
 xv 
At the same time, the PERF recommendations may not do much to help the situation on 
the ground. In fact, they may confuse both law enforcement officials trying to keep the 
peace and the public observing police actions as to just what the standards are. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Shortly after the Ferguson, Missouri, protests and riots following the officer-
involved shooting of Michael Brown in August 2014, the Police Executive Research 
Forum (PERF) held three conferences and drafted three documents. The first document, 
entitled Defining Moments for Police Chiefs, was published in February of 2015.1 The 
second document, Re-engineering Training on Use of Force, was said to explain the third 
document.2 The third document was 30 Guiding Principles on Use of Force.3 The 30 
Guiding Principles and Re-Engineering Training reports called for significant changes in 
how use-of-force incidents should be judged. PERF is said to create best practices, but its 
policy recommendations on other topics have been cited in case law as creating 
precedence.4 Specifically, the PERF reports call for agencies to develop policies that go 
beyond standards under the current threshold of “objective reasonableness,” articulated in 
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Graham v. Connor.5  
At issue are the constitutional rights of criminal suspects, or any other citizens 
interacting with law enforcement—specifically Fourth Amendment protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. Excessive force in the course of an arrest, if it is 
proven, certainly counts as unreasonable. But what is the threshold? And who gets to 
decide? During one of the three PERF conferences, Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
Vanita Gupta stated, “I think it is revolutionary and transformative to be talking about 
going beyond current understanding of what is ‘objectively reasonable’ per Graham v. 
Connor. There is a real mismatch between what community standards are, what the 
community expects, and what they think the law should be, as opposed to what the law 
                                                 
1 Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), Defining Moments for Police Chiefs (Washington, DC: 
PERF, 2016). 
2 PERF, Re-engineering Training on Police Use of Force (Washington, DC: PERF, 2016). 
3 PERF, PERF’s 30 Guiding Principles on Use of Force (Washington, DC: PERF, 2016). 
4 PERF, 2011 Electronic Control Weapon Guidelines (Washington, DC: Police Executive Research 
Forum, 2011).  
5 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).  
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allows for.”6 This “mismatch” has played out in the days of unrest, some of them violent, 
as in the cases of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, in August of 2014, Eric Garner 
in July 2014, and Freddie Gray in Baltimore in April 2015. Riots broke out in response to 
each of these incidents. Citizens and police officers were injured and there was major 
property damage. Additionally, in the wake of these events, there was a significant 
increase in deaths of officers by gunfire.  
The PERF’s high profile and the political charge of the issue of police use of 
force attach great weight to such statements. At the same time, the PERF 
recommendations may not do much to help the situation on the ground. In fact, they may 
confuse both law enforcement officials trying to keep the peace and the public observing 
police actions as to just what the standards are. An unworkable standard and confusing 
policy are not standard at all and may even make everyone—officers, suspects, and 
civilian by-standers—less safe. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT-BACKGROUND 
The current and long-standing basis for evaluating use of force by police officers 
in subduing a suspect or securing evidence at a scene is “objective reasonableness.”7 This 
standard comes from the Supreme Court decision in Graham v. Connor, which explicitly 
states: “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the 
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, and its calculus must embody an 
allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second decisions 
about the amount of force necessary in a particular situation.”8 The reasonableness and, 
therefore, legality of the use of force depends on “the severity of the crime at issue … 
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others … 
and whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by 
                                                 
6 PERF, “PERF’s 30 Guiding Principles, 36. 
7 Tom Jackson, “Protocol for Reducing Police Shootings Draws Backlash from Unions, Chiefs 
Group,” Washington Post, March 30, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/move-to-
reduce-police-shootings-draws-sharp-backlash-from-unions-chiefs-group/2016/03/30/03c81e6a-ec55-11e5-
bc08-3e03a5b41910_story.html.  
8 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), 396–397. 
 3 
flight.”9 This three-pronged test is purposefully imprecise; it uses what PERF describes 
as “broad principles on how police use-of-force is to be considered and judged” because 
each individual situation has so many variables that contribute to the decisions made by 
officers in the field and ultimately comes down to the judgment of the officer on the 
scene.10 
The court specifically writes that reasonableness must not be adjudged through 
the lens of “20/20 hindsight.”11 To be sure, the so-called Graham factors are objective in 
the sense that the officer’s intent does not figure into the equation. The court in Graham 
writes, “An officer’s evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of 
an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer’s good intentions make an 
objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.”12 Rather, one must look to the 
“totality of the circumstances,” as in any Fourth Amendment analysis, the court writes.13 
Policy No. 2 in PERF’s 30 Guiding Principles recommends, “Agencies should 
continue to develop best policies, practices, and training on use of force issues that go 
beyond the minimum requirements of Graham V. Connor.”14 PERF “recommends a 
number of policies that should be considered … to take steps that help prevent officers 
from being placed in situations where they have no choice but to make split-second 
decisions.”15 The document does not specify just how these higher standards might shape 
up, but it does recommend the implementation of such measures as “requiring a duty to 
intervene if officers witness colleagues using excessive or unnecessary force, requiring 
officers to render first aid to subjects who have been injured as a result of police actions, 
                                                 
9 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), 396. 
10 PERF, “PERF’s 30 Guiding Principles, 36. 
11 490 U.S. at 396. 
12 Ibid., 397, citing Scott v. United States, 436 U. S. 128 (1978), 138, which in turn cites United States 
v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218 (1973). 
13 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), 396, citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), 8–9. 
14 PERF, PERF’s 30 Guiding Principles, 35. 
15 Ibid., 17. 
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prohibiting use of deadly force against persons who pose a danger only to themselves, 
and prohibiting officers from shooting at vehicles.”16  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What effect might going beyond current legal standards have on police use-of-
force incidents in practice and in the public perception? Can the policy principles put 
forward by PERF in its recommendations make policing safer for officers and the public 
they serve?  
C. BACKGROUND 
The legal requirements of Graham v. Connor regarding the use of force by law 
enforcement articulate the factors that are taken into consideration to analyze an officer’s 
decision to use force. In addition to the Graham factors, “the calculus of reasonableness 
must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-
second judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving about 
the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.”17 This case came just four 
years after Tennessee v. Garner, which provides the requirements to determine when 
deadly force can be used to prevent the escape of a fleeing felon.18 The court articulated 
that the officer must have “probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant 
threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.”19 These two Supreme 
Court decisions form the current precedence on use of force. 
Since Eric Garner died while being arrested by New York police in July of 2014 
and Michael Brown was fatally shot by police in August of 2014, there has been 
consistent public debate about police use of force. Both incidents resulted in riots, unrest, 
and protests across the nation.20 Some protests were peaceful and some resulted in 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 36. 
17 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
18 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
19 Ibid. 
20 John Eligon and Manny Fernandes, “In Protests from Midwest to Both Coasts, Fury Boils Over,” 
New York Times, November 24, 2014, http://nyti.ms/1yaaMFm. 
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arrests, injured officers, and chants of, “From Ferguson to LA, these cops have to pay.”21 
Scrutiny of police use of force, especially police killing of mentally ill people, unarmed 
people, and minority people, increased.22  
Another major focus is on the lack of data collection about people killed by the 
police.23 The New York Times did a Sunday review titled, “Are the Police Bigoted?”24 
This article questioned the lack of data relating to lethal force and if there was, in fact, a 
racial component. The Washington Post created its own database through open sources in 
an effort to track people who were shot and killed by police.25 Post managing editor 
Cameron Barr said, “We needed to do this because it wasn’t being done well. People in a 
democratic society have a right to know the results of the state’s use of force in the 
enforcement of law.”26 Reporter Wesley Lowery stated the database started because they 
had “activists telling us that this happens all the time, that black men are being executed 
in the street, especially unarmed black men.”27 Many activists who call for 
demonstrations over police killings across the nation often cite racism as the catalyst.28  
Much of the discussion in the public domain is based on race. Pew Research 
Center conducted a poll of 1,000 people in August of 2014 and found, “Blacks and 
whites have sharply different reactions to the police shooting of an unarmed teen and the 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 2. 




25 “Fatal Force,” Washington Post, accessed February 27, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
graphics/national/police-shootings-2016/.  
26 Allison Michaels, “Inside the Washington Post’s Police Shootings Database,” A Medium 
Corporation, December 16, 2015, https://medium.com/thewashingtonpost/inside-the-washington-post-s-
police-shootings-database-an-oral-history-413121889529#.8hgkljpre. 
27 Allison Michaels, “Inside the Washington Post’s Police Shootings Database,” Medium, December 
16, 2015, 3, https://medium.com/thewashingtonpost/inside-the-washington-post-s-police-shootings-
database-an-oral-history-413121889529#.8hgkljpre. 
28 Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Stephen Babcock, “Scenes of Chaos in Baltimore as Thousands Protest 
Freddie Gray’s Death,” New York Times, April 25, 2015, http://nyti.ms/1JpmxOV. 
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protests and violence that followed.”29 The poll found that 80 percent of blacks (as 
respondents self-identified) thought the shooting of Michael Brown “raises important 
issues about race,” while 37 percent of whites felt the same way. As far as the response to 
the shooting, 65 percent of black respondents said the police response went too far, 20 
percent said the response was about right, and 15 percent did not know. About one-third 
of whites felt the police response went too far, one-third felt it was about right, and one-
third did not know. Research and surveys of minority groups have shown that numerous 
communities lack trust in police, doubt that officers are being held accountable, and 
believe that “police are likely to use excessive force.”30   
Black Lives Matter (BLM) has been one of the most active and critical groups. 
Born out of protests from the Ferguson riots, this small activist group grew in such 
volume and tenacity that Time magazine named BLM as fourth runner up for Person of 
the Year.31 Time described the movement as “a political force” and that it was “rooted in 
the rejection of police violence.”32 BLM has been involved in the protests that resulted in 
the resignation of police leaders and educational leaders.33 BLM has also been involved 
in struggles with police supporters.34  
Although most of the debate and criticism revolves around race, there are other 
consistently voiced concerns. A couple leading concerns are the lack of prompt release of 
an officer’s name after an incident and the lack of officer training to deal with mentally ill 
persons.35 The largest debate centers on the killing of people described as “unarmed,” 
especially if they are black.36 Of the 60 unarmed people killed in 2015, 24 of them were 
                                                 
29 Paul Hitlin, “Stark Racial Divisions in Reactions to Ferguson Police Shooting,” Pew Research 
Center, August 18, 2014, http://www.people-press.org/2014/08/18/stark-racial-divisions-in-reactions-to-
ferguson-police-shooting/. 
30 John Wihbey and Leighton Walter Kille, “Excessive or Reasonable Force by Police? Research on 
Law Enforcement and Racial Conflict,” Journalist’s Resource, October 29, 2015, 2. 
31 Ibid., 1. 
32 Ibid., 4–5. 
33 Ibid., 7–9. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid., 1–7. 
36 Sandhya Somashekhar et al., “Black and Unarmed,” Washington Post, August 8, 2015, 1–14. 
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black men, which represented 40 percent of the killings—a much higher percentage than 
the population of black men.37 Although unarmed deaths by police are frequently 
debated, an article in the Washington Post by Abby Phillip pointed out that the killing of 
an “unarmed white teen” in South Carolina prompted “almost no national outrage.”38 
Political attention to the Ferguson shooting and riots was swift. PERF 
immediately used the “Defining Moments” conference to start discussions on the 
Ferguson incident.39 During the conference, up to 300 police executives discussed the 
Ferguson incident and other events that have created concern for them as police leaders. 
PERF ultimately created three use-of-force reform documents.40 Some politicians and 
scholars agree with PERF that there is a need to change the way policing is done in 
America.41  
Two days after the shooting in Ferguson, the attorney general announced a federal 
investigation into the matter, and President Obama sent condolences to the Brown 
family.42 The President commented on the attorney general investigation and officially 
stated, about Michael Brown, “I urge everyone in Ferguson, Missouri, and across the 
country, to remember this young man through reflection and understanding.”43 After the 
verdict not to indict Officer Darren Wilson for the shooting of Michael Brown, President 
Obama issued a statement from the White House. He said, “The fact is, in too many parts 
of this country, a deep distrust exists between law enforcement and communities of 
color…I don’t think that’s the norm. I don’t think that’s true for the majority of 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 2. 
38 Abby Phillip, “An Unarmed White Teen Was Shot Dead by Police. His Family Asks: Where Is the 
Outrage?” Washington Post, August 7, 2015, 1–6. 
39 PERF, Defining Moments. 
40 PERF, PERF’s 30 Guiding Principles. 
41 Wihbey and Kille, “Excessive or Reasonable Force,” 2. 
42 David Hudson, “President Obama Issues a Statement on the Death of Michael Brown,” The White 




communities or the vast majority of law enforcement officials.  But these are real 
issues.”44  
A lack of support from political leaders and police leaders added to the growing 
anti-cop narrative. Peter Chiaramonte wrote that police felt a “growing anti-cop sentiment 
as a result of the Ferguson incident and other high-profile incidents.”45 Police felt there 
was a “war on police” when FBI data showed 51 officers were killed in the line of duty in 
2014.46 Most of the police discourse has been in response to the PERF Guiding 
Principles on Use of Force document and its recommendation that officers should be 
held to standards higher than those set forth in Graham v. Connor.47 International 
Association of Chiefs of Police and Fraternal Order of Police issued a joint statement 
stating they “reject any call to require law enforcement agencies to unilaterally, and 
haphazardly, establish use-of-force guidelines that exceed the ‘objectively reasonable’ 
standard set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court nearly 30 years ago.”48  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
In my 15-year experience as a police officer, I would argue that most, if not all, of 
the policy recommendations in PERF’s guiding principles are already held and practiced 
by most police officers and agencies. At the same time, while the PERF documents seem 
ready to jettison the standards of Graham v. Connor, I must question what the new 
standards might look like, how they might work, who might enforce them on the officers, 
and who must implement them. 
PERF’s website describes the organization as “an independent research 
organization that focuses on critical issues in policing.” The members are chiefs of police 
                                                 
44 “Remarks by the President after Announcement of the Decision by Grand Jury in Ferguson, 
Missouri,” The White House, November 24, 2014, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/11/24/remarks-president-after-announcement-decision-grand-jury-ferguson-missou. 
45 Peter Chiaramonte, “War on Police: Line of Duty Deaths Rise Amid Racially Charged Rhetoric, 
Anti Cop Climate,” Fox News, May 17, 2015, http://www.foxnews.com/us/2015/05/17/war-on-police-line-
duty-deaths-rise-amid-racially-charged-rhetoric-anti-cop.html.  
46 Ibid. 
47 PERF, PERF’s 30 Guiding Principles. 
48 Chuck Canterbury, “Statement of the IACP and FOP on Use of Force Standards,” IACP, accessed 
June 16, 2016, http://www.iacp.org/ViewResult?SearchID=2652. 
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of larger agencies, sheriffs, and heads of state agencies. Chuck Wexler, the executive 
director of PERF, was also the co-chair of the politically driven President’s Task Force 
on 21st Century Policing.49 PERF’s Guiding Principles on Use of Force was completed 
between the summer of 2014 and March of 2016. The final report of The President’s 
Task Force on 21st Century Policing was completed between January and May of 2015.50 
The concurrency, results, and recommendations of both documents raise a question of 
whether they are more political than practical. This distinction is important in large part 
because real-world law enforcement officers must still affect real-world arrests within a 
workable legal framework.  
My thesis dissects and analyzes PERF’s proposals regarding use-of-force reform 
and its guiding principles, specifically the recommendation to “go beyond the minimum 
requirements” of Graham v. Connor.51 In this thesis, I use the current laws governing use 
of force and the history of how those laws came to be in order to understand how those 
laws relate to use of force. I also determine how the current laws relate to the discretion 
and authority afforded to law enforcement. 
I detail the Ferguson incident as a tipping point for anti-police protests and outline 
the public discourse, police discourse, and the political discourse for an understanding of 
each group’s positions. I focus on the political response, from the president to local 
policy makers, to include the creation of PERF’s 30 Guiding Principles, in an effort to 
reform police use of force. I detail key policy recommendations from PERF as they relate 
to use of force, but my analysis specifically focuses on the first eight policy 
recommendations.  
Using my experience as a law enforcement professional and the data from my 
research, I evaluate the vastly varying opinions to determine what the disconnect is and if 
a higher standard would bridge the gap and make a difference in practice and/or in public 
perception.  
                                                 
49 President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 
21st Century Policing (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2015). 
50 Ibid. 
51 PERF, PERF’s 30 Guiding Principles, 17. 
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II. LEGAL STANDARDS 
In response to the public protest of the events in Ferguson, PERF put out 
recommended policies that suggested police agencies “should develop policies, practices, 
and training on use of force issues that go beyond the minimum requirements of Graham 
v. Connor.”52 Although there have been several milestone federal and state legal changes 
that have affected use of force in the United States, Graham v Connor provided a 
framework with which to evaluate the reasonableness of force used by police.  
Throughout the years there have also been several lower court decisions that have 
highlighted and refined the reasonableness standard, to include balancing tests on 
governmental interest and tests for the amount of force used. While there has not always 
been complete agreement on court decisions, the courts have established precedents for 
law enforcement to follow and use in training. Adhering to the letter and the spirit of 
these tenets of reasonable use of force also underlies the qualified immunity that protects 
police officers from lawsuits or prosecution if they are discharging their duties lawfully. 
This chapter provides a history on how the law, as it relates to use of force, has 
progressed through the years and where it is today. It also discusses qualified immunity 
and demonstrates how these doctrines work in practice in several California cases.  
A. REASONABLENESS AND USE OF FORCE 
The Supreme Court provides well-defined standards in analyzing use of force 
cases through two cases decided 30 years ago. Tennessee v. Garner in 1985 provided 
boundaries for using deadly force on a fleeing felon, and Graham v. Connor in 1989 
provided an “objective reasonableness” standard that allows for review of alleged 
excessive force claims to be determined based on the “totality of the circumstances” as 
perceived by the officer without the benefit of “20/20” hindsight.” The reasonableness 
test is incredibly important for law enforcement to be able to effectively perform their 
duties without fear of second-guessing or Monday-morning quarterbacking. The courts 
                                                 
52 PERF, PERF’s 30 Guiding Principles, 35. 
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have recognized the need to evaluate reasonableness based on the officer’s perspective in 
many decisions.  
Graham v. Connor owes much to the earlier Tennessee v. Garner case, which 
helped to define and restrict the use of deadly force to apprehend a “fleeing felon,” 
including its constitutionality.53 Prior to the court’s decision in Tennessee v. Garner, use 
of deadly force to apprehend a person thought to have committed a felony fell to the 
states. States were generally split on what their use of deadly force laws allowed. Most 
states fell into three categories of law that was followed: common law, model penal code, 
and a variation of the two.54 Tennessee law, under common law principles, still allowed 
for use of deadly force on any fleeing felon.  
Garner was an unarmed 15-year-old boy who was fleeing from the scene of a 
burglary. In an effort to stop the fleeing burglar from jumping the fence and getting away, 
the police officer fired his gun at Garner, striking and killing him. The officer testified 
that he was not in fear, but that he knew he would not be able to apprehend Garner. 
Garner’s father sued the officer and a whole host of other people in district court for 
violating his son’s civil rights. The court found that the officer did not violate Tennessee 
statutes or his department’s policy and therefore did not violate the suspect’s civil rights. 
The case was dismissed and the plaintiff appealed the decision. The appellate court 
reversed the decision using the Fourth Amendment as the test and found Tennessee’s 
statute did not restrict the use of force and therefore was unconstitutional. Tennessee 
attempted to defend the statute and brought it to the Supreme Court.  
Tennessee argued that because the statute “was the prevailing rule at the time of 
the adoption of the Fourth Amendment and for some time thereafter, and is still in force 
in some States, use of deadly force against a fleeing felon must be reasonable.”55 The 
Court admitted that it had “often looked to the common law in evaluating the 
                                                 
53 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
54 Chad Flanders and Joseph C. Welling, “Police Use of Deadly Force: State Statutes 30 Years after 
Garner,” Saint Louis University Law Journal, January 24, 2017, http://www.slu.edu/colleges/law /journal 
/police-use-of-deadly-force-state-statues-30-years-after-garner/. 
55 “Tennessee v. Garner,” Justia, footnote 21, accessed March 1, 2017, https://supreme.justia.com/ 
cases/federal/us/471/1/case.html#F21. 
 13 
reasonableness, for Fourth Amendment purposes, of police activity.”56 The Court refused 
to rule the statute reasonable just because it had been in existence since the adoption of 
the Fourth Amendment. The Court instead cited the more restrictive Model Penal Code 
(MPC) as reference for the case, “Though effected without the protections and formalities 
of an orderly trial and conviction, the killing of a resisting or fleeing felon resulted in no 
greater consequences than those authorized for punishment of the felony of which the 
individual was charged or suspect.”57  
The Court also took the opportunity of its decision to review the laws in each of 
the 50 states. The justices found that almost half the states had codified common law and 
half had adopted some version of the MPC. Four states still had pure common law, two 
states adopted MPC verbatim, and the remaining states had no documentation defining 
their laws. California and Indiana were two of the states that had adopted common law, 
but had taken extra steps to restrict the use of deadly force.58  
Common law allowed for use of deadly force against any felon. The Court of 
Appeals of California heard a number of cases over the years, including Kortum v. Alkire, 
and decided that deadly force was only authorized if the felony was a “forcible and 
atrocious one, which threatens death or serious bodily harm.”59 The Tennessee v. Garner 
case made clear to the other states that common-law rule on use of deadly force to seize 
any felon was not restrictive enough and was “lacking in humanity” because deadly force 
could be considered even if no weapons were involved and it was not a dangerous 
felony.60 Although some states have changed their laws to be more in line with 
Tennessee v. Garner, some states to this day have made no change to their common law 
to require that the felony be a violent felony or involve threats of any bodily harm.61  
                                                 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid., footnote 14.  
58 Flanders and Welling, “Police Use of Deadly Force.” 
59 Kortum v. Alkire, Court of Appeals of California, Civ. No. 38947 (1977); People v. Martin, Court 
of Appeals of California, Crim. No. F004497 (1985). 
60 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
61 Flanders and Welling, “Police Use of Deadly Force.” 
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Four years later, in 1989, the Supreme Court decided Graham v. Connor, 
changing the way excessive force claims were analyzed. First, the prevailing “shock the 
conscience” test was changed to an “objective reasonableness” test.62 The “shock the 
conscience” test came out of Rochin v. California in 1952. It involved forced retrieval of 
evidence when the suspect, Rochin, was taken to the hospital and forced to vomit pills he 
had swallowed.63 The court alleged Rochin’s due process was violated when evidence 
was forced from his body. In Justice Frankfurter’s decision, he said, “This conduct 
shocks the conscience.”64 Conduct that shocks the conscience would be further clarified 
with a four-part test that came from the 1973 case Johnson v. Glick. Although this case 
came from a corrections facility, it was used as the standard for excessive force claims. 
The four factors provided by the court were: “1) the need for the use of force; 2) the 
relationship between the need and the amount of force used; 3) the severity of the injuries 
sustained by the subject; and 4) whether force was applied in good faith or maliciously 
and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.”65 The courts often had differing 
application of the test so the injuries sustained were often the central deciding factor.66  
The Glick case was decided under the Fourteenth Amendment and stood as the 
standard for excessive force cases for many years. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the 
due process standard protects any person from government deprivation of “life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law.”67 The Graham v. Connor decision examined 
excessive force claims through the Fourth Amendment “objective reasonableness” 
standard. Justice Rehnquist’s opinion to use the Fourth Amendment was based on the 
specific facts of the Graham v. Connor case. Because the allegation of excessive force 
                                                 
62 Darrell L. Ross, “An Assessment of Graham v. Connor, Ten Years Later,” Policing: An 
International Journal of Police Strategies & Management 25, no. 2 (June 2002): 297. 
63 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). 
64 Ibid. 
65 Johnson v. Glick, 352 F.Supp. 577 (1972), 1033. 
66 Ross, “An Assessment of Graham v. Connor,” 297. 
67 “U.S. Constitution—Amendment 4,” U.S. Constitution Online, accessed February 13, 2017, 
http://www.usconstitution.net/xconst_Am4.html.  
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centered on an arrest or seizure of Graham’s person, the court used the Fourth 
Amendment’s freedom from unreasonable search and seizure in its decision.  
This alleged Fourth Amendment violation created the need to make clear “the test 
of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or 
mechanical application” and that “the reasonableness of a particular use of force must be 
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 
20/20 vision of hindsight.”68 The court also made clear that “the reasonableness inquiry 
in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ 
actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting 
them.”69 Chief Justice Rehnquist explained in the decision: 
This case requires us to decide what constitutional standard governs a free 
citizen’s claim that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the 
course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other “seizure” of his 
person. We hold that such claims are properly analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment’s “objective reasonableness” standard, rather than under a 
substantive due process standard.70 
Although federal law delivers a decision and creates opportunity for civil rights 
violations, it does not change state law. So an officer could be cleared of any criminal 
acts by the state if he or she was found to have acted properly within the confines of state 
law and still be found to have violated a citizen’s right under federal law. In addition to 
possible civil rights violations created by Tennessee v. Garner and Graham v. Connor, 
Monell v Department of Social Services of the City of New York created civil liability to 
agencies that violated those civil rights, if the government worker was following 
department policies and practices.71 Although this court case probably was the cause of 
police agencies taking a much more restrictive approach to their policies and practices, 
                                                 
68 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., 386. 
71 Samuel Walker and Lorie Fridell, “Forces of Change in Police Policy: The Impact of Tennessee v. 
Garner,” American Journal of Police 11 (1992): 106. 
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Tennessee v. Garner pointed out that more than 85 percent of police departments already 
had more restrictive policies than allowed in common law.72  
The Supreme Court over the years has diligently created and refined a balancing 
test for analyzing excessive-force claims. The framework allows for the fact that police 
are often placed in situations in which force is necessary based on the officer’s perception 
at the time.  
B. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY 
These standards matter because as long as a police officer is found to be acting 
lawfully within the range of official duties, then he or she enjoys immunity from 
prosecution, even if the officer’s actions result in the injury or death of a suspect. (This 
immunity is “qualified” by the provision that the officer acted lawfully.) The qualified 
immunity doctrine is protection from a civil lawsuit for performance of duties as a 
government official. The courts have recognized the inherent danger of civil lawsuits that 
government workers face. In the 1982 Supreme Court case Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the 
court wrote, “Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are 
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”73  
The process has changed over the years from involving both a subjective and 
objective test. The current test is solely an objective test that can be decided without the 
need for the “costly process of discovery and trial.”74 The “subjective determination 
typically would require discovery and testimony to establish whether malicious intention 
was present.”75 The courts saw the conflict this created and went to the objective test. 
“This shield of immunity is an objective test designed to protect all but ‘the plainly 
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incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’”76 Qualified immunity “is not 
appropriate if a law enforcement officer violates a clearly established constitutional 
right.”77  
Overly restrictive policies that are adopted by agencies can have a direct impact 
on whether or not an officer receives qualified immunity, as they can make the rules 
unclear. The diminishment of what constitutes justifiable use of force and therefore 
qualified immunity has already started to occur, as evidenced by the spike in officers 
being charged with murder for on-duty shootings.78   
C. CASES 
The framework provided in Graham v. Connor and refined by other lower court 
cases already require what PERF has indicated would be increased standards such as de-
escalation, time and distance, and proportionality. Graham also acknowledged the fact 
that police officers are often forced to make split-second decisions. The following Ninth 
Circuit court cases highlight how difficult it is to determine the reasonableness of use-of-
force incidents, but also highlight how effective the courts have been in determining 
when an officer has used excessive force. 
In Deorle v. Rutherford, the Ninth Circuit examined the shooting of an 
emotionally disturbed man on his own property with a less-than-lethal beanbag gun.79 
The beanbag struck Deorle in the eye, leaving him with serious and permanent damage. 
The court used the Graham standard of objective reasonableness to determine if officer 
Rutherford’s use of force was reasonable. Rutherford was on a perimeter around Deorle’s 
property. The court essentially found that Deorle was contained and obeying commands. 
They determined that Rutherford did not issue any commands to stop and, in addition, 
“Rutherford was stationed in a secure position behind a tree, his line of retreat was clear, 
                                                 
76 Ibid. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Matt Ferner and Nick Wing, “Here’s How Many Cops Got Convicted of Murder Last Year for on-
Duty Shootings,” Huffington Post, January 13, 2016, http://www.huffington post.com/entry/ police-
shooting-convictions_us_5695968ce 4b086bc1cd5d0da. 
79 Deorle v. Rutherford, 9th Cir. 272 F.3d 1272 (2001). 
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and Officer Nichols was stationed almost immediately behind him. Rutherford could 
easily have avoided a confrontation, and awaited the arrival of the negotiating team by 
retreating to his original position behind the roadblock.”80 The court also found, “A 
desire to resolve quickly a potentially dangerous situation is not the type of governmental 
interest that, standing alone, justifies the use of force that may cause serious injury. There 
must be other significant circumstances that warrant the use of such a degree of force at 
the time it is used.”81   
The interesting part of this case was that the court did more than just apply 
Graham; the court analyzed if “the officer made a reasonable mistake as to the legality of 
his actions.”82 The court assumed that Rutherford believed his actions were reasonable, 
but questioned if his belief was reasonable. The court explained, “Qualified immunity 
operates…to protect officers from the sometimes hazy border between excessive and 
acceptable force.”83 Ultimately, the court wrote in its decision, “Every police officer 
should know that it is objectively unreasonable to shoot—even with lead shot wrapped in 
a cloth case—an unarmed man who: has committed no serious offense, is mentally or 
emotionally disturbed, has been given no warning of the imminent use of such a 
significant degree of force, poses no risk of flight, and presents no objectively reasonable 
threat to the safety of the officer or other individuals.”84 The decision by the court based 
on the facts presented was that Rutherford used unreasonable force against Deorle and 
was therefore denied qualified immunity. Deorle also created a measurement to 
determine the gravity a use-of-force case imposes by analyzing “the type and amount of 
force inflicted.”85  
A second Ninth Circuit case, Bryan v. MacPherson, applying the Graham v. 
Connor standards also concluded that an officer used excessive force when “he deployed 
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his X26 Taser in dart mode to apprehend Carl Bryan for a seatbelt infraction, where 
Bryan was obviously and noticeably unarmed, made no threatening statements or 
gestures, did not resist arrest or attempt to flee, but was standing inert twenty to twenty-
five feet away from the officer.”86 The officer was initially denied qualified immunity. 
There were two other Taser cases pending in the Ninth Circuit and MacPherson requested 
the court to reconsider based on the two other cases. The court did reconsider the case 
and determined that MacPherson would be entitled to qualified immunity. “It explained 
that the constitutionality of using the Taser in dart mode was not clearly established when 
MacPherson Tasered Bryan.”87  
As with many other court decisions, Judges Richard Tallman, Maria Consuelo 
Callahan, and N. Randy Smith dissented. Judge Tallman wrote, “Police officers are 
allowed to act in reasonable self defense…yet, in Brian v MacPherson, we deem 
unconstitutional the actions of a police officer who did just that.”88 He continued, 
MacPherson “was confronted by a mostly naked man who reacted with irrational rage to 
being directed to stop his car for a simple seatbelt violation. He shouted ‘f***’ over and 
over, repeatedly punched his steering wheel, ignored the officer’s commands to remain in 
his car, shouted gibberish, pummeled his own thighs, and did not retreat when the officer 
yelled at him to get back in his car.”89 Most interestingly was Tallman’s opinion that, 
nine years earlier, the court in Deorle “rewrote the standard.”90 Tallman wrote: 
Despite this clear, consistent, and controlling Supreme Court precedent, a 
single judge of our court, joined only by a senior judge of a different 
circuit sitting by designation, charted a new path in 2001. Without citing a 
single case, the court in Deorle rewrote the standard: “The degree of force 
used by [law enforcement] is permissible only when a strong 
governmental interest compels the employment of such force.” 272 F.3d at 
1280. To justify this conclusion, the Deorle panel quotes Graham out of 
context. Specifically, the Deorle majority wrote that the Graham factors 
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87 Tim Hull, “9th Circuit Won’t Revisit Officer’s Use of Taser,” Courthouse news Service, November 
30, 2010, https://www.courthousenews.com/9th-circuit-wont-revisitofficers-use-of-taser/. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Ibid. 
90 Bryan v. MacPherson, 630 F. 3d 805 (2009). 
 20 
“are simply a means by which to determine objectively ‘the amount of 
force that is necessary in a particular situation.’” Id. (quoting Graham, 490 
U.S. at 396–97, 109 S.Ct. 1865). The full sentence from Graham actually 
reads: “The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the 
fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments—
in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the 
amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 
U.S. at 396–97, 109 S.Ct. 1865. It is clear that Graham envisions a flexible 
standard, appropriate to “reasonableness”; Deorle nonetheless requires the 
police to use only the minimum force necessary. That is not the law the 
Supreme Court has articulated as the standard applicable to police officers 
as they make these time-pressured and difficult decisions.91 
In a third case from the Ninth Circuit, Young v. County of Los Angeles, the court 
once again found that excessive force was used when Deputy Wells pepper sprayed Mark 
Young for not obeying his order to return to his vehicle. This resulted from a traffic stop 
of Young for not wearing his seatbelt. While Deputy Wells was writing Young a traffic 
citation, Young exited the vehicle to provide Wells with his registration. Wells told 
Young to wait in his vehicle. Young did not reenter his vehicle and instead told Wells he 
preferred to sit on the curb in front of his vehicle. Wells continuously told Young to get 
back in his vehicle. When Young did not comply, Wells came up from behind him and 
pepper sprayed him with no warning. Young stood up and Wells continued to pepper 
spray him and strike him with a baton. Wells never alleged that he felt threatened by 
Young before pepper spaying him.  
The court used the standards in Graham to determine “whether…officers’ actions 
are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them.”92 
The court also balanced “the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment interest against the countervailing governmental interests at stake” as quoted 
in Tennessee v. Garner.93 The court also used the decision in Deorle to determine, “The 
gravity of the particular intrusion that a given use of force imposes upon an individual’s 
liberty interest is measured with reference to ‘the type and amount of force inflicted.’”94 
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The court mentions, also from Deorle, “Warnings should be given, when feasible, if the 
use of force may result in serious injury, and…the giving of a warning or the failure to do 
so is a factor to be considered in applying the Graham balancing test.”95 
The Supreme Court and lower courts, as described in the previous cases, have 
analyzed many excessive-force claims and attempted to apply logic to situations that 
often were anything but logical. There are many factors that go into decisions made by 
the courts in determining if excessive force was used. One factor that is typically left out 
is the resistance or force used against a police officer in the performance of his or her 
duties. This factor was almost silent in the PERF reports and recommendations. 
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III. POLICE AS THE BAD GUYS: THE NARRATIVE 
The current narrative about police brutality by racist cops and the immediate call 
for use-of-force reform began in Ferguson and continued after a series of high-profile 
fatal police shootings. Public and political sentiment ranged from frustration to hatred 
toward law enforcement. Constant media attention validated the public’s anger with a 
barrage of stories highlighting the racial differences between the police officers and the 
individuals shot. The anger and frustration felt by communities around the nation boiled 
over in protests, riots, and call for violence toward police from select groups. Activists 
organized and political leaders issued statements contributing to the narrative that police 
killings have been racially motivated. Politicians around the nation, from local city 
council members to the President of the United States, commented on the fact that they 
felt race was a factor in the recent shootings and within the entire criminal justice system. 
Contempt for police came from every aspect of society. Social media was abuzz with 
constant stories of police abuse.  
This chapter outlines the narrative that came from different groups and 
contributed to the growing conflict between police and the community. The frequently 
divisive nature of the narrative and the resulting conflict provides insight into why there 
would be such a push to provide the public with use-of-force reform.   
A. FERGUSON 
The use of force debate immediately centered on race and out-of-control cops. 
The headlines after the Ferguson incident frequently invoked the “unarmed black teen” 
and the refrain of “hands up don’t shoot.” Articles highlighted the fact that the police 
officer was white and he killed an unarmed black teenager, Michael Brown. Facts 
presented by witnesses within days of the shooting allege that Brown was either running 
away or attempting to surrender, but that he had his hands up.96 Protests and riots 
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included signs that said, “Stop Police Brutality & Murder,” “Black Lives Matter,” “Jail 
Killer Cops,” and “Stop Racist Police Brutality” (see Figure 1). 
  
 
Figure 1.  Protest Signs97 
                                                 
97 Source: (Top Left) Sophie J. Evans and Kieran Corcoran, “Michael Brown and Eric Garner 
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(Top Right) Jessie Daniels, “Research Suggests Why Grand Juries Fail to Indict,” Racism Review, 
December 29, 2015, http://www.racismreview.com/blog/tag/police-brutality/; (Bottom) “Police Brutality Is 
a Blue-State Problem,” The Black Conservative, January 29, 2016, http://blackconservative360. 
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B. ACTIVISTS AND BLACK LIVES MATTER 
BLM started in response to Trayvon Martin’s death at the hands of George 
Zimmerman. Many felt that Zimmerman had followed Martin simply because Martin was 
black. BLM did not gain national attention until the group’s involvement in organizing 
protests of the Michael Brown killing in Ferguson. BLM’s website claims the group 
fights state violence against black people and anti-black racism.98 BLM believes black 
lives are “systematically and intentionally targeted for demise.”99 The group alleges that 
black people are “unfairly targeted,” stopped more often, and arrested more often, as well 
as have force used against them more often than it is used against white people.100  
Members are fairly absolute in their rejection of law enforcement as a practice 
and an idea. BLM activist Jessica Disu spoke out on the show “The Kelly File” in favor 
of disarming the police and/or abolishing police departments.101 When questioned about 
how the public would keep their communities safe, she stated that one life lost was too 
much and that they would come up with “community solutions.”102 She is not alone in 
her idea that police should be unarmed; for example, Paul Krane argues that gun control 
should start with the police.103 And former Green Party presidential candidate Jill Stein 
feels the same way.104 During one of the protests in Ferguson, Al Sharpton gave a speech 
outside the courthouse. He said, “St. Louis is in fact bearing witness for America. The 
Band-Aid has been ripped off, and all of America is seeing the open wound of racism 
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exists.”105 BLM and many other activists tell a story of rampant racism and police 
brutality by police. 
C. POLITICAL LEADERS 
Politicians were quick to jump on the anti-police bandwagon. The U.S. President 
himself offered support to the Brown family three days after the shooting. His statement 
said: 
The death of Michael Brown is heartbreaking, and Michelle and I send our 
deepest condolences to his family and his community at this very difficult 
time. As Attorney General Holder has indicated, the Department of Justice 
is investigating the situation along with local officials, and they will 
continue to direct resources to the case as needed. I know the events of the 
past few days have prompted strong passions, but as details unfold, I urge 
everyone in Ferguson, Missouri, and across the country, to remember this 
young man through reflection and understanding. We should comfort each 
other and talk with one another in a way that heals, not in a way that 
wounds. Along with our prayers, that’s what Michael and his family, and 
our broader American community, deserve. 
His support for Brown and others bolstered the anti-police narrative. President Obama 
went on supporting the narrative of racist police in many other statements. In July of 
2016, President Obama spoke out regarding the killings of Alton Sterling and Philando 
Castile. He stated that he could not comment on specific facts, but felt all “Americans 
should be troubled by the shootings.”106  
Obama also cited statistics he felt proved that racial disparities “exist in our 
criminal justice system.”107 He also commented frequently on how dangerous and 
challenging police work can be, but made no calls for citizens to comply with police 
orders. He also has acknowledged the failure of society in a larger problem that police are 
now expected to address. The President was quoted by NPR as saying, “Too often we’re 
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asking police to man the barricades in communities that have been forgotten by all of us 
for way too long.”108 While this statement seems to be in support of police, it reinforces 
the feeling that the police are an occupying force that have taken over neighborhoods. 
Other political comments have centered around the initial facts that were 
presented in Ferguson, the “hands up don’t shoot” narrative, and the response to the 
protests and riots. On August 14, 2014, Senator Rand Paul wrote an opinion piece for 
TIME entitled “We Must Demilitarize the Police.”109 In the article, Paul writes, “If I had 
been told to get out of the street as a teenager, there would have been a distinct possibility 
that I might have smarted off. But, I wouldn’t have expected to be shot.”110 This kind of 
opinion piece did very little for police relations and actually seemed to reinforce the 
public outrage.  
D. PUBLIC PROTEST AND RIOTS 
In response to a call for justice for Michael Brown, protests and rioting occurred 
in Ferguson, Missouri, and all around the nation. The protests ranged in size and 
temperament, but the call for justice was the consistent theme. The police handing of the 
protests in Ferguson came under scrutiny from many, even those in law enforcement. The 
police used armored vehicles, weapons, and tear gas in attempt to control the situation. 
Many critics of Ferguson’s response would say the protests were peaceful and the police 
felt like an occupying force.111  
The St. Louis County grand jury’s decision not to indict Darrin Wilson in the 
shooting of Michael Brown once again brought protests from around the nation. With the 
protests and riots came chants of, “From Ferguson to L. A. these killer cops have got to 
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pay.”112 One protest march in December of 2014 included BLM and the Million Man 
March. Another group of protestors claiming association with Trayvon Martin 
Organizing Committee, which advocates against “racist police practices,” separated from 
the larger protesting groups and began chanting for violence.113 The chant was, “What do 
we want? Dead cops! When do we want them? Now!”114  
E. SOCIAL MEDIA 
Comments on social media posts and articles have echoed these narratives—the 
charges of racial discrimination and the calls to disarm the police forces. Many also have 
called for violence against police. Some postings from July 2016 were captured through 
social media and documented in an article by James Barrett.115 The screen capture shown 
in Figure 2 speaks volumes of the anger felt by some in black communities. Ben Baller, a 
jeweler to many famous artists, has more than 400,000 followers and posted the tweet in 
Figure 2 the day of the Dallas shootings. 
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Figure 2.  Twitter Post from Ben Baller before Killings of Dallas Police116 
At the time of the screenshot capture in Figure 2, @BenBaller’s tweet had been 
retweeted 168 times. Two days before the Dallas killings, @BenBaller tweeted, “I want 
to kill 100 cops every time I hear ‘stop resisting’ RIP #AltonSterling.” At the time of the 
screenshot capture in Figure 3, his tweet had been retweeted 255 times. 
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Figure 3.  Twitter Posts from Ben Baller and Others Days before Killings of 
Dallas Police117 
One of the most provocative statements did not actually call for violence but 
encouraged it: “Soon the tables will turn” was tweeted hours before the ambush killings 
of Dallas police officers and retweeted 108 times at the time of screenshot shown in 
Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.  Twitter Post from @BlackNefertiti Hours before Killings of 
Dallas Police118 
The sentiment to kill cops is an example of how incendiary the relationship is 
between police and some members of the public. 
F. TRADITIONAL MEDIA 
The news media and conventional entertainment programs have actively 
participated in the divisive anti-police narrative, frequently listing the race of both the 
officer and the person shot as if it were the main factor in the use of force. When Michael 
Brown was killed, headlines persistently described him as an unarmed black teen. 
However, the reality was that he was a 6’5,” 289-pound adult male.119 The St. Louis 
                                                 
118 Source: Ibid. 
119 Peter Eisler, “Ferguson Case: By the Numbers,” USA Today, November 25, 2014, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/11/25/ferguson-case-by-the-numbers/70110614/. 
 32 
Grand Jury investigation also found evidence that Brown had attempted to grab Wilson’s 
gun while Wilson was seated in his vehicle.120  
In October of 2016, St. Louis police attempted to contact a 14-year-old boy 
walking with another man. The boy ran and pulled a gun on the police officer chasing 
him. The boy fired the gun at the police and they returned fire. The article that reported 
the incident mentioned, “The two officers involved are white; the teen is black.”121 In an 
unfortunate reality, that statement had more to do with the case than the actual facts; as 
the article described, citizens immediately gathered at the scene and challenged the facts 
presented by the police. St. Louis Alderman Chris Carter was quoted in the article saying, 
“People are just tired of the police shootings.”122  
The New York Times Sunday Review featured an article by Michael Wines, “Are 
Police Bigoted?” In it, Wines wrote, “The death of the black teenager shined a spotlight 
on the plague of shootings of black men by white police officers.”123 Although Wines 
was admittedly unable to find any research that pointed to race being part of the decision 
for police officers to use deadly force, he wrote, “But most interesting, perhaps, was the 
race of the officers who fired their weapons. About two-thirds were white, and one-third 
black-effectively identical to the racial composition of the St. Louis Police Department as 
a whole. In this study, at least, firing at a black suspect was an equal-opportunity 
decision.”124 Using “equal-opportunity” when referring to shooting people suggests 
Mines believes it is something police look forward to doing.  
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G. POLICE KILLINGS 
Although the Trayvon Martin Organizing Committee later claimed it did not 
mean what it said, there would be two dead cops a week later and many more killed in 
ambush-style killings after that. Between 2015 and 2016, police ambush killings 
increased by almost 70 percent; the year ended with 64 officers killed in ambush 
attacks.125 The first two police officers to be ambushed in an unprecedented spree of 
police ambush-style killings were Officers Wenjian Liu and Rafael Ramos of the New 
York Police Department. The officers were sitting in their vehicle when Ismaaiyl 
Brinsley approached the passenger window of their patrol car and shot both men dead. 
Neither officer had time to pull their weapons.126  
Several other high-profile police ambush killings took place, the largest occurring 
when five officers were killed and six wounded in Dallas on July 7, 2016, at a previously 
scheduled BLM rally. The shooter in this incident, Micah Johnson, was killed during the 
exchange but told “authorities that he wanted to kill white people, especially white 
officers.”127 Ten days later, on July 17, 2016, Gavin Long would ambush police officers 
in Baton Rouge, killing three and injuring another three. The shooters in both of those 
attacks were killed. Chief David Brown said Johnson told police in negations that “he 
was upset about Black Lives Matter…and about recent police shootings.”128 He said 
Johnson “was upset at white people…he wanted to kill white people, especially white 
officers.”129 Long created many podcasts under the name “Cosmo Setepenra.”130 He 
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ranted “about ‘fighting back’ against ‘bullies’ and discussed the killings of black men at 
the hands of police.”131 In one video he referred to Johnson as “one of us.”132 This 
discourse not only divides law enforcement and their communities further, it calls for 
violence. 
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IV. PERF’S 30 GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
The road to hell is paved with good intentions. 
—Proverb 
 
In response to the public outcry after the events in Ferguson, PERF refocused a 
series of already scheduled “Defining Moments” seminars to address law enforcement’s 
role in the increasing conflict with community members. The seminars produced three 
separate reports: Defining Moments for Police Chiefs, Re-engineering Training on Police 
Use of Force, and 30 Guiding Principles on Use of Force.133 The 30 Guiding Principles 
report provided best-practice policy recommendations on use of force that were 
immediately controversial, garnering attention from major police groups and police 
attorneys. 
This chapter outlines the basis for PERF’s creation of the 30 principles, the 
themes that came out of the recommendations, expert opinions on adoption of the policy 
recommendations as written, the implications PERF has created with the publishing of 
the principles, and finally the weaknesses of the guiding principles in their stated goal of 
making policing safer.  
A. CREATION OF THE 30 GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
The background of the creation of the 30 guiding principles was the Re-
Engineering Training on Police Use of Force report.134 Chuck Wexler wrote in his 
summary of the report: 
PERF’s Board of Directors was quick to realize that the rioting last 
summer in Ferguson was not a story that would fade away quickly, and we 
decided to hold a national conference in Chicago about the implication of 
Ferguson for policing. As we look back at the most controversial police 
shooting incidents, we sometimes find that while the shooting may be 
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legally justified, there were missed opportunities to ratchet down the 
encounter, to slow things down, to call in additional resources, in the 
minutes before the shooting occurred.135 
The process was led by Chuck Wexler and consisted of “nearly 300 police chiefs and 
other law enforcement executives, federal government officials, academics, and 
representatives from policing agencies in the UK,” discussing use-of-force incidents and 
application.136  
The group that contributed to PERF’s final recommendations was missing one 
major component: officers who actually work in the field. Jim Glennon from Calibre 
Press responded to the PERF recommendations with a suggestion to “get the perspective 
of those who actually do, not just the theories of those who study and intellectualize what 
they read about cops.”137 Most of the police chiefs and executives who belong to PERF 
have long since “done” police work in the field, and some never have.   
Many police executives and police attorneys have weighed in on PERF’s 30 
guiding principles and the context in which they were created. Retired Chief of Police, 
attorney, police trainer, and program manager for Lexipol Michael D. Ranalli wrote an 
article for The New York Chief’s Chronicle analyzing the “principles and supporting 
context.”138 Ranalli felt the PERF principles were “not suitable for immediate adoption 
by agencies since further context is required.”139 Ranalli wrote, “This report must be 
viewed with a very critical eye because some of the principles are expansive, conclusory 
statements that do not provide sufficient basis for complete understanding of the 
principles’ intended scope, let alone adoption.”140 Similarly, David Bolgiano and 
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Douglas R. Mitchell wrote a response to PERF’s recommended principles, calling them 
“ill advised.”141  
Bolgiano and Douglas felt the context in which the report was written was “based 
on the popular but completely incorrect perception that American police officers use 
force, particularly lethal force, at high rates and unlawfully.”142 In response to PERF’s 
recommendation to adopt policies that go beyond the current legal precedents, they 
wrote, “Contrary to the assertions made by PERF, the Constitutional standard, when 
combined with sound and current training on the recognition and control of violent, 
threatening behavior, is certainly sufficient.”143 
Mildred (Missy) O’Linn, a retired police officer, attorney, technical expert in law 
enforcement civil liability and peace officer training and tactics instructor, also wrote a 
response to the principles recommended by PERF.144 O’Linn was an attendee at the Re-
Engineering Police Use of Force conference and “left with some serious concerns about 
the dialogue and the concepts that were being considered.”145 She, like others, felt “the 
overall theme of the PERF meeting seemed to be that American policing is bad: bad 
cops; bad tactics; and bad training.”146 The report documented O’Linn’s concern. Wexler 
wrote that the number-one issue was stated as “training currently provided to new recruits 
and experienced officers in most police departments is inadequate.”147 PERF also found 
that cultural changes were needed to reduce use of force.148 While PERF did not fault 
police officers for not having better training, the report created an inference that the 
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public outrage was deservedly at the feet of law enforcement. O’Linn wrote “with the 
media in the room we heard zero support for our officers…it appeared PERF was 
validating that campaign by the presentation in that meeting confirming the epidemic.”149  
B. CENTRAL THEMES 
The actual recommended principles, as pointed out by Ranalli, were “so 
intertwined” that while they could, and should, be applied to all training, they should not 
be considered “stand alone” or “complete concepts.”150 Still, some central themes 
emerge, including that law enforcement should value the sanctity of human life, use force 
that is proportionate, and de-escalate whenever possible.  
1. De-escalation/Sanctity of Human Life/Proportionality 
Several of the principles were central to the concepts. Ranalli points out the 
implications of suggesting that law enforcement does not already work based on these 
core beliefs fails to take into consideration that police officers contact tens of millions of 
people each year and get it right 99 percent of the time.151 Similarly, O’Linn points out in 
her response, “De-escalation is the goal of law enforcement officers dealing with 
confrontations and violent encounters.”152 The danger of de-escalation/sanctity of human 
life/proportionality as a stand-alone concept is that it infers this “fundamental change,” as 
PERF refers to it, will change use of force.  
The principles provided by PERF as “fundamental changes” also imply that 
officers’ actions have dictated the amount of force necessary as opposed to the suspect or 
subject’s actions. PERF found that officers were moving in too quickly and they 
recommended slowing things down or “tactically disengaging.”153 The group wrote that 
the idea is: “If you can calm the situation down and walk away from a minor 
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confrontation, and nothing bad happens when you leave, that may be a better outcome 
than forcing a confrontation over a minor conflict.”154 This type of conclusion fails to 
take into consideration that “there must also be cooperation on the part of the 
suspect/subject.”155 It also suggests that officers are escalating “minor incidents.” 
More important in this connection is the idea of “legitimacy,” as proposed by 
Ranalli: 
The real key here, and what needs to be an essential component of any 
officer’s decision-making process in relation to enforcement, is the 
purpose of the initial encounter itself: Is it lawful and for a legitimate (e.g., 
non-discriminatory) purpose? If the enforcement purpose passes the test of 
legitimacy, then the resulting scenario will be driven, to a large extent, by 
the violator. 
Legitimacy of purpose can support legitimacy of specific police actions, 
even though those actions may appear in isolation to be excessive. 
Officers do sometimes respond in an overly aggressive manner and/ or 
take no time to try to talk a person down. That must change, but these 
principles are not comprehensive enough for practical implementation and 
are not the appropriate way to address the issue. Many of the police videos 
that have gone viral involve officers who are attempting to enforce a 
“minor offense” that is legitimate and, if the person cooperated, as the vast 
majority do, would have resulted in the violator going on his/her way with 
minimal delay. Yes, officers need to take these situations slowly and not 
make decisions out of legitimate enforcement actions must be completed 
and officers need to clearly know what is expected of them.156 
PERF recommended adopting the Critical Decision-Making Model (CDM). This 
model included a series of questions officers should be asking themselves, such as “What 
exactly is happening? What is the nature of the risks or threats? What powers do I have 
legally and within policy to respond? Do I need to take action immediately? Am I the 
best person to deal with this? If I take a certain action, will my response be proportionate 
to the seriousness of the threat?”157  
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These questions are basic core questions that police officers are already trained to 
ask themselves in any field training program. Officers are trained to determine what is 
happening, what the threats are, how they should respond, and what authority they have 
to intervene. The minor difference between what police officers already do and the CDM 
is that PERF has formalized the model and presented it as if it is a brand new idea to 
consider those questions. The major difference is what PERF is suggesting should be 
considered in the decision-making process.  
Under the model proposed by PERF, officers should take into consideration if the 
use of force was proportionate. PERF has put forth, under policy 3, the test of 
proportionality, which includes officers asking themselves, “How would the general 
public view the action we took? Would they think it was appropriate to the entire 
situation and to the severity of the threat posed to me or to the public?”158 Bolgiano and 
Mitchell responded: “PERF appears to be substituting the mistaken and sometimes 
willful ignorance of certain segments of the public for valid analysis of what constitutes a 
reasonable use of force.”159 They go on to write, “An officer’s use of force in response to 
an imminent threat of death or grievous bodily injury should never be proportional to the 
threat presented. One need not and ought not bring a knife to a knife fight.”160 Ranalli 
points out in his response that PERF focuses on “minor offenses” when referring to 
proportionality.161 He says, “Proportionality, as the term should be considered, already 
falls within the purview of a Graham objective reasonableness analysis and this is where 
it should remain.”162  
San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) police commission modeled use-of-
force reform policy after the PERF guiding principles. The San Francisco Police Officers 
Association (SFPOA) had the policies analyzed by Blake P. Loebs, an attorney and 
police trainer with extensive experience. The proposed policy required force to be 
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“proportionate to the severity of the offense committed.”163 He compared SFPD’s 
proposed policy to Seattle Police Department’s General Order, in which “the requirement 
to use proportional force does not stand on its own.”164 Loebs added that “the concept is 
not just tied to the severity of the offense, but also to the threat to the officer or the 
public.”165 Loebs stated, “In every other instance in which I have seen that term used 
(with one exception, referenced PERF), it is directly tied to the Graham v. Connor 
framework.”166 Loebs’s primary concern is that “the proposal does not define what is 
meant by ‘proportional force.’” He felt the “proposal could suggest that ‘proportional’ 
means that the officers are required to match the degree of force being used by the 
suspect…if an officer is being threatened by a knife, the maximum force the officer can 
use in response is a knife.”167  
Loebs commented on PERF’s recommendation that officers take into 
consideration “how the general public might view the action.” He wrote that the 
suggestion is “essentially requiring officers defer to future YouTube commentary for 
determining whether the use of force is appropriate at the time.”168  
2. Going above the Legal Standard 
Loebs was also concerned with the lack of definition of proportionate and 
questioned whether it would be “consistent with Graham or a departure from that legal 
standard.”169 In the document, PERF has recommended police departments “develop 
policies, practices, and training on use of force issues that go beyond the minimum 
requirements of Graham v. Connor.”170 Ranalli disagrees: “That is the law and we 
should not create a separate standard in our own policies. My concern is that 
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administrators will fail to recognize that the use of force decision is legally different from 
tactical decisions made by officers before a use of force incident.”171 He was firm in his 
caution to administrators and wrote that it was “not just a matter of semantics.”172 Ranalli 
agreed that changes involving crisis response and slowing situations down was 
appropriate, “but that in no way, shape or form should involve creating a higher legal 
standard on officers who are susceptible to mistakes when under high-stress 
conditions.”173  
This clarification was much needed for administrators if they had read comments 
in the report, such as Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Vanita Gupta’s 
comments, “I think it’s revolutionary and transformative to be talking about going 
beyond current understanding of what is ‘objectively reasonable’ per Graham v. Connor. 
There is a real mismatch between what community standards are, what the community 
expects, and what they think the law should be, as opposed to what the law allows 
for.”174  
The National Association of Police Organizations, which represents more than 
1,000 police units and 241,000 officers, also cautioned, “The Graham v. Connor decision 
is not merely an optional ‘legal standard,’ it’s the Supreme Court’s explanation of what 
the Constitution requires…it instructs courts how to analyze the actions of law 
enforcement officers after the fact. And these cases are usually civil, not criminal in 
nature.”175 National Association of Police Organizations laments, “If PERF wants to 
change the Constitution, go right ahead, but don’t mislead readers into thinking that 
Constitutional law has suddenly become optional for police chiefs, prosecutors and 
jurors.”176  
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3. Questionable Real-World Application of PERF Principles 
Adopting PERF’s guiding principle policies has questionable real-world 
application, a substantial amount of debate, and in some cases is counter to current law 
and common sense, as in the case of “Policy 8, Shooting at vehicles must be 
prohibited.”177 This policy recommendation warranted special attention by many that 
analyzed the policies. Bolgiano and Mitchell called Policy 8 “completely out of touch 
with the realities of a deadly assault on police officers or innocent citizens.”178 Ranalli 
felt the same, writing that “language that definitively prohibits an action will inevitably 
result in a situation where an officer violates the policy under reasonable circumstances, 
which in turn can create issues that must be dealt with if litigation results.”179  
John F. Timone, a member of PERF, commented in the PERF recommendations, 
“A strict policy does not mean there will never be an exception to the rule.”180 Ranalli 
responded: “If you know this will reasonably happen, I cannot grasp why any 
administrator would want to create such a policy.”181 O’Linn was just as exasperated 
when she wrote: “Make no mistake, shooting at or from a moving vehicle is strongly 
discouraged by all law enforcement agencies. However, an absolute prohibition does not 
have a basis in the realities of this world.”182 Finally, Loeb, in his review of the proposed 
SFPD policy, wrote, “The ban on officers shooting at the operator of a vehicle who is 
only using the vehicle as a weapon will endanger the public and officer or require officers 
to choose between saving a life or their job.”183  
Loeb also commented on how the current SFPD policy addressed concerns of 
officers unnecessarily shooting at drivers when the officer could have instead gotten out 
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of the way.”184 The policy stated, “Officers could only shoot at the driver if there was an 
imminent threat of serious bodily injury or death and the officer had no reasonable or 
apparent means of retreat.”185 The SFPD policy wording is common among agency 
policy. Lexipol has a similar policy. Lexipol’s policy on shooting at or from moving 
vehicles states: 
Shots fired at or from a moving vehicle are rarely effective. Officers 
should move out of the path of an approaching vehicle instead of 
discharging their firearm at the vehicle or any of its occupants. An officer 
should only discharge a firearm at a moving vehicle or its occupants when 
the officer reasonably believes there are no other reasonable means 
available to avert the threat of the vehicle, or if deadly force other than the 
vehicle is directed at the officer or others.186 
Officers should not shoot at any part of a vehicle in an attempt to disable the vehicle. 
Lexipol has provided strong policy language that strictly limits shooting unless 
there are no other reasonable means. It puts the responsibility on the officer to move out 
of the path of any approaching vehicle. It also allows for the inevitable situation in which 
an officer would be forced to shoot at the driver to save lives. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
#deescalation & #complying citizens is the answer #commonground 
—Tweet from Reverend Jarrett Maupin 
 
A. FINDINGS 
Many have commended PERF for its intentions with the 30 Guiding Principles 
document while others have questioned its motivations. Michael Ranalli points out most 
of the praise came from the “mainstream media, while criticism came from police circles, 
including attorneys who defend officers and municipalities.”187 PERF member Vanita 
Gupta accurately said, “There is a real mismatch between what the community standards 
are…and what [the community thinks] the law should be.”188  
Nevertheless, PERF’s solution to increase the standards for police is not the 
answer, as evidenced by Reverend Maupin’s experience with the Maricopa County 
Sheriff’s Office. Maupin, who described himself on his Twitter account as a “Progressive 
Baptist Preacher…Civil Rights Campaigner…[and] Radical Political Activist,” was 
invited by Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office to participate in use-of-force scenario 
training.189 Maupin participated in three different scenarios. In the first scenario, Maupin 
attempted to contact a suspicious person in a parking lot. The person refused to cooperate 
or speak with Maupin. The person kept walking behind a vehicle and would not listen to 
Maupin’s commands to stop. The person then came out from behind the vehicle and shot 
Maupin.  
The second scenario involved two men engaged in an argument. Maupin 
approached the men and asked, “What’s going on today, gentlemen?”190 One of the men 
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rushed Maupin, who shot the unarmed man. The third scenario ended with Maupin 
contacting a non-compliant suspect and getting him onto the ground. The suspect refused 
to give Maupin his hands. In the end the suspect was found to have a knife in his 
waistband. A reporter then participated in the same scenarios and, according to the 
article, “the results were the same.”191 After the training, Maupin said, “I didn’t 
understand how important compliance was, but after going through this, yes my attitude 
has changed—this happens in 10–15 seconds. People need to comply for their own 
sake.”192 Maupin is exactly “the community” to which Gupta was referring when she 
spoke of the mismatch of expectations. The focus has been placed on law enforcement to 
change. Maupin’s experience is an indication of a wider problem involving non-
compliance. 
The common criticism of the seminars that led up to PERF’s recommendations 
has been PERF’s failure to address support for police officers. Ranalli very eloquently 
says he wished PERF had “issued a challenge to our elected officials and asked that they 
make public statements condemning the behavior of persons who clearly refuse to 
comply with the lawful commands of officers. This has been sorely missing for the last 
couple of years and our officers are seeing the result: people who feel entitled and 
emboldened to challenge officers. Such attitudes do nothing but create flash points that 
perpetuate the problem.”193 When law enforcement experts and political leaders 
condemn police use of force but do not address the actions of the subject, it does not 
make policing safer for anyone. O’Linn suggests, “Not only do we need to remind the 
community and the media that American law enforcement officers are overwhelmingly 
doing a great job and that they want to protect and serve with honor and integrity, but that 
those officers need the members of the communities that they serve to help them.”194 
Community members often do not understand the danger of resistance. The lack of 
leadership to call for compliance does more harm than good.     
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Police officers are aware that using force looks ugly. In an effort to bridge the gap 
that Gupta identified, police departments all over the United States have extended 
outspoken critics invitations to participate in use-of-force scenario testing. Many of the 
critics have refused to participate. Those who have participated have learned why lack of 
compliance is the driving factor in most use-of-force cases. Addressing this problem area 
must involve law enforcement, politicians, civic leaders, and activists. If protecting 
human life is really the goal of those protesting in the streets, compliance with lawful 
orders must be a central discussion, yet it is absent in public discourse. 
B. LIMITATIONS 
PERF sets unrealistic expectations, unattainable goals, and confusing restrictions 
with its policy recommendations. J. Michael McGuinness, an attorney with 25 years of 
experience in defending police officers, has written on why policing requires the 
retention of the reasonable belief standard. He writes, “The body of reasonable belief law 
cannot be changed without devastation to effective policing and officer safety. The 
American police community will aggressively resist purported reforms that will 
inevitably increase police officer deaths throughout America.”195 The discrepancy 
between police use-of-force and the public’s view is the training and experience that a 
police officer receives. It is also the dangerous environment in which they work, and case 
law recognizes that over and over again in the courts. PERF’s recommendations came on 
the heels of the Ferguson incident. The riots and the public protest created an 
environment wherein political acquiescence formed policy recommendations.  
Agencies like the SFPD are currently bearing witness to the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police’s concern “about calls to require law enforcement 
agencies to unilaterally, and haphazardly, establish use of force guidelines that exceed the 
‘objectively reasonable’ standard.”196 The SFPD has been forced by the city’s police 
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commission through a unanimous vote to accept policy changes that closely mirror 
PERF’s policy recommendations.  
The police union is battling over wording such as “minimal force” as opposed to 
“reasonable force.”197 The commission has threatened to issue “temporary department 
bulletins to enforce rules such as making sure officers ‘shall’ use de-escalation 
techniques.”198 As Ranalli points out, this is not just semantics. He writes, “The manner 
in which this principle is written may allow for inappropriate changes to policy pertaining 
to the legal standards for use of force, when the focus really needs to be on tactics and 
decision making leading up to the need and/or decision to use force.”199 Ranalli 
recognizes that PERF’s intention may have been to focus on training and opportunities to 
de-escalate. His concern is, “Agencies may interpret Guiding Principles #2 as 
encouraging them to change their use of force polices to require a higher legal standard 
than Graham. Such a change is not appropriate and will not solve the real problem,” 
assuming anyone can define the real problem.200 Some protestors, rioters, and 
community activists say the problem is that police are racist murderers. PERF says police 
have too much leeway and are moving too fast. However, neither of those narratives 
works for the two days of riots, violence, and burning that happened in September 2016 
in Charlotte, after a black police officer shot a non-compliant black suspect that was 
armed with a gun.201  
When a group such as PERF puts out best-practice policies that, as written, are 
unclear and too broad, it confuses city leaders and the public into thinking those policies 
should be adopted. An unintended consequence of PERF’s policy recommendations and 
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the reports it produced is that it affirmed to the public that police officers were using 
force inappropriately. By attempting to make policing safer, PERF may have 
unintentionally made policing much more difficult. According to the Pew Research 
Center, the calls for reform have “made [police] jobs riskier, aggravated tensions between 
police and blacks, and left many officers reluctant to fully carry out some of their 
duties.”202 PERF’s recommendations add to the volume of procedures that police officers 
are already attempting to navigate. 
C. FURTHER RESEARCH 
An area of research that had been suggested by Geoffrey Alpert in his testimony 
to the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing is the collection of use-of-force 
data. He recommends exploring “officer decision making…to look at unsuccessful 
encounters as well as those that are successful.”203 He suggests analyzing the data to 
“help understand these situations.”204Alpert also suggests a single repository to examine 
patterns, trends, and even anomalies.205 He raises some interesting points over what the 
data and analysis might provide:  
The media makes sensational headlines about the number of rounds fired 
in an encounter. What if that number is not sensational but close to the 
average for a specific type of situation where the suspect has a specific 
type of weapon? There are media reports of unarmed subjects being shot. 
What if there were ways to know what the suspect did that prompted the 
officer to use deadly force? What if the agency could report the reason that 
each shot was fired? We could answer questions about contagion fire, the 
comparative frequency of force or deadly force in particular types of 
places or against particular types of people? We need to move beyond 
anecdotal to empirical!206 
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Having this type of empirical data could help bridge the gap between law enforcement 
actions and community expectations.  
D. CONCLUSIONS 
This research questioned what effect going beyond the legal standards might have 
on use-of-force incidents and public perception. This research has uncovered serious 
debate over the applicability and understanding of PERF’s policies. Law enforcement 
experts have expressed concern over adopting the policies as written. They have also 
questioned if use-of-force reform was even necessary. It is not in dispute that law-
enforcement officers have a difficult and dangerous job. Nor is it disputed that, the 
majority of the time, they get it right. 
PERF’s policy recommendations have confused city leaders and the public into 
thinking its policies should be adopted. The number of cities across the nation that have 
rushed to adopt PERF’s policies or are in the process of doing so is evidence that police 
departments are being strong-armed into adopting them. For example, Chicago, 
Baltimore, and San Francisco police departments have adopted PERF’s policies or 
versions of them.207 The failure in PERF’s attempt to make policing safer is that it 
assumes the false narrative of police being the problem, and it assumes the recommended 
ideas were not already being practiced by police officers every day. As Ranalli 
recommends, police agencies should “use the PERF use of force principles as one part in 
your agency’s continuous quality improvement process, not as the complete answer.”208 
There must be a combination of compliance by the public and de-escalation by police 
officers. There is typically no question when a police officer uses force upon a compliant 
subject. Police agencies would be much more apt to recognize “bad cops” or excessive 
force if the subject does not fight with the officer.  
PERF failed to define the problem before embarking on its solution. Surpassing 
legal standards to create more opportunity to indict police officers for using force against 
physically resistant subjects will not solve what Obama has described as “deeply 
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embedded racism” in our country. These policies limit police officer discretion and lean 
toward a post hoc evaluation, which is contrary to the ruling in Graham v. Connor. Use-
of-force reform will not fix the problems we are experiencing in society. In a press 
conference after the ambush killing of police officers in Dallas, Chief David Brown said, 
Every societal failure, we put it on the cops to solve. Not enough mental 
health funding, let the cop handle it. Not enough drug addiction funding, 
let’s give it to the cops. Here in Dallas we have a loose dog problem. Let’s 
have the cops chase loose dogs. Schools fail, give it to the cops. 70 percent 
of the African-American community is being raised by single women, 
let’s give it to the cops to solve as well. That’s too much to ask. Policing 
was never meant to solve all those problems. I just ask other parts of our 
democracy along with the free press to help us.209 
It seems PERF may have attempted to use the law to solve a problem that cannot 
be fixed by law. In order to make policing safer for everyone, police departments and 
their communities need to come together to define the problems particular to their 
jurisdictions. Community activists and political leaders need to discuss the importance of 
compliance. And, of course, police departments must continually train their personnel in 
using de-escalation techniques.  
E. WHERE WE GO FROM HERE  
To Law Enforcement Leaders 
1. As a law-enforcement leader, do not rush to judgment. The only rush 
should be to deliver known facts to the community—when all the facts are 
in, admit any wrongdoing. If the facts show the officers acted reasonably, 
we need principled leaders who have the courage to stand up for their 
officers when warranted.  
2. As a law-enforcement leader, adopt solid, defensible policies that allow 
officers to do their jobs. When considering policy changes, include line 
level officers in the discussion; after all, they are doing the work.  
3. Avoid adopting zero-tolerance policies. They can create an environment in 
which officers feel they must take action when there may be better 
solutions.  
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4. Give your police officers the tools and training they need to succeed. 
Ensure they are equipped with less lethal options and are trained in their 
use. We have witnessed tragic events occur when officers had the tools to 
effectively resolve a situation but lacked the necessary training to use 
them.  
To Law Enforcement Supervisors 
1. Go out and supervise! Make sure your staff is using force sparingly and 
treating the community with respect. Effective supervisors should know if 
one of their employees is involved in more use-of-force situations than the 
others. There may be an explanation, but it could be an indication that the 
officer may be using force inappropriately or too quickly—or is doing the 
escalating. Watch for these signs, and provide the necessary interventions.  
2. Train, train, train. Starting with the police academy, make sure they are 
training your recruits the way you want them to be trained. Have frequent 
and realistic training with your teams. Teach your officers to be critical 
thinkers and ready to react so they are not caught off guard.  
3. Provide your officers with support so they know they can go out and do 
their jobs. If they are fearful of acting, it creates a dangerous environment 
for everyone involved.  
4. Expect nothing less than excellent service. Ultimately, we are public 
servants. Make sure your officers understand that, and demand nothing 
less.   
To the Line Level 
1. Make opportunities to get out of your car and create relationships with 
your communities. Show the people you swore to protect that you will do 
just that. Use force sparingly. I heard this at some point in my career: 
“You get the last act; let them have the last word.” If you build trust in 
your community, most people will stand by you or at least reserve 
judgement when the critical incident happens.  
2. Invite your local advocates, the media, and community members to 
experience force-option scenarios so they understand how difficult it 
becomes when the person fails to cooperate or comply. Better yet, invite 
your chief and those who may have forgotten what it was like to work the 
streets to participate. Community members like Reverend Maupin would 
be excellent advocates for imparting how important compliance is for the 
safety of everyone involved. Many of the high-profile events of the last 
several years have centered on non-compliance.  
 
 53 
To Politicians and Civic Leaders 
1. Your literal silence on the danger of not complying with lawful police 
orders creates an unnecessary and dangerous condition. This silence has 
contributed significantly to the tragic outcomes we have witnessed over 
the years. Your collective failure to urge citizens to comply with lawful 
orders has emboldened them to challenge and often violently resist police 
in the performance of their duties. There are avenues and recourse if 
citizens feel they have been unfairly targeted or treated. The street is not 
the place to hold court.  
2. Slow down your desire to condemn police actions to the media. The 
practice of being first to comment on the 24-hour news cycle to tell people 
what they want to hear is inflammatory and negligent. Reserve judgment 
until you fully understand the circumstances.  
3. If you are invited to participate in a police force-option scenario, do it. 
You cannot make decisions, call for changes to law, or try to preempt the 
court process if you do not understand the risks and dangers associated 
with being a police officer. The decision to act or not can mean life or 
death; you will never fully understand that fact. You can, however, get a 
taste of how it feels by experiencing use-of-force scenarios.  
 
This thesis has proven to me that the current use-of-force debate is not an “us 
against them” fight. It cannot be. No change in law or policy will make a difference or 
make policing safer. The change must come from each of us having a sincere desire to 
make a difference and improve wherever we can. 
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